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ABSTRACT
Revolutionary leaders of Virginia, the state with the 
most extensive western claims, considered it their 
responsibility to help direct congressional land policy.
This study of Virginia and the West focuses on the influence 
of Thomas Jefferson, James Monroe, and George Washington on 
United States territorial policy, 1780-1787. Within this 
paper their opinions are used to represent the spectrum of 
political thought in Virginia toward the West. Their 
contributions are traced through an analysis of the 
Ordinances of 1784, 1785, and 1787, with particular emphasis 
on the last.
All three men agreed that new states should be created 
in the West. They differed on how to develop these new 
states so that they would be a positive addition, rather 
than a hindrance, to the Union. They also wished to 
strengthen the links between Virginia and the West.
The thesis concludes with an explication of the 
Ordinance of 17 87 emphasizing how it addressed the perceived 
problems of the time. It also analyzes how the territorial 
ordinances reflect changing attitudes toward the strength 
and character of the central government.
vi
VIRGINIA AND WESTERN TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, 1780-1788
CHAPTER I
TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE CONFEDERATION PERIOD
The most common map in American history textbooks is 
that of the nation's westward growth. When we view today's 
United States, criss-crossed by Interstate highways and 
bound by an ever-present mass culture, the earlier 
expansion of the nation takes on an aura of inevitability. 
This perspective, however, obscures the contemporary 
debates and uncertainty that accompanied the republic's 
geographic growth.
At the close of the Revolution in 1783, the United 
States had no western territories. Instead, the future 
national domain was imperfectly divided into the 
overlapping claims of individual states. Within seven 
years, however, the United States had both a national 
domain and a plan for its governance. That plan, the 
Ordinance of 1787, was to form the basis of U. S. 
territorial policy through the following century. The 
ordinance was the product of many minds, but the leaders of 
one state, Virginia, were instrumental in determining the 
shape of western policy during the 1780s. Virginia, as the 
state with the most extensive western claims, strongly 
influenced the nation's western policy. The views of her 
leaders toward the West were, in turn, shaped by a
2
3combination of political philosophy and personal ties with 
the West.
The following essay will first explore the views of 
three Virginians who represented the general range of 
political opinion in their state toward the nation's 
western policy during the 17 80s, namely, Thomas Jefferson, 
James Monroe, and George Washington. The opinions of 
others will be considered to the extent that they affected 
the outlook of these men.1 The final chapter will 
explicate the Ordinance of 1787, emphasizing how it 
addressed the perceived problems of the time and 
highlighting portions of the ordinance not discussed 
earlier.
American Revolutionaries were aware of the fragility of 
their victory over the British Empire. While some 
advocated continental expansion for the new republic, most 
thoughtful Americans were more patient.2 They believed 
that the example of Roman history had proven the danger of 
mixing an empire and a republic. They expected to use 
peaceful persuasion and example, rather than military 
force, to accomplish the spread of republican ideals. Thus 
they supported the provision in the Articles of 
Confederation that allowed Canadians to join the union if 
they elected to do so, two unsuccessful invasions having 
proved that the issue could not be forced.
This conviction, that the United States lacked the
4military strength to conquer Canada, also caused some 
leaders to doubt the ability of the United States to 
maintain control the trans-Allegheny West. Though these 
territories had been formally acquired by the Treaty of 
Paris of 1783, it was feared that what had been won through 
diplomacy and bluff would be lost by distance and bullets. 
British troops were still in possession of the Northwest 
posts. Spain quickly proved to be a fair-weather ally as 
it moved to negate American claims through its control of 
the Mississippi. Both European powers were, in American 
eyes, overly friendly with the Indians.
The Confederation's western policy was further clouded 
by the doubtful loyalty of Americans already settled west 
of the Alleghenies. Colonial and state legislatures had 
experienced difficulty in controlling their immediate 
hinterlands.3 It was feared that the trans-Allegheny 
region--what was then the far West--would prove even more 
problematic. This uncertainty led the Confederation 
government to debate almost all aspects of western policy.
The Revolutionary generation tended to view the West 
and its people along two broad dichotomies. First, the 
region could be seen as either a westward extension of the 
eastern states by liberal interpretation of colonial 
charters or as the foundation of a new national domain won 
through the common sacrifices of the states. Second, 
western settlers were believed to be either an independent 
society existing in a state of nature or a subordinate
5society--the newly independent Americans were reluctant to 
use the word colony--in need of guidance and protection.
Of the two views of the region itself, the first tended to 
predominate in states with western claims, the so-called 
"landed" states. Opposing them were the "landless" states 
with limited bounds and no western claims, which wanted to 
prevent the potentially vast "landed" states from gaining a 
disproportionate influence in national affairs. "Landless" 
states preferred to see the West as part of a common prize 
won during the Revolution. Views along the second 
dichotomy, the human and political landscape, were less 
easily predicted, depending as they did more on political 
temperament than on state loyalties.
The debate over the future of the West was formally 
resolved with the passage of the Ordinance of 1787, 
commonly known as the Northwest Ordinance. This ordinance 
set forth the guiding principles of United States 
territorial policy for the next century. At its most basic 
level the ordinance provided for a territorial government 
for the newly settled western regions. Though based on 
colonial principles, the territorial government was the 
first step to the granting of full statehood and inclusion 
of new states in the Union as equal members. At its most 
symbolic, the ordinance laid the foundation for what Thomas 
Jefferson later called an expanding "empire of Liberty."4
The importance of the ordinance is often overshadowed 
by the far greater importance of the Constitution. The
6Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia easily outshone 
what was left of the Confederation Congress meeting in New 
York City. History has been far kinder to the attendees of 
the former than to those of the latter. But while 
historians have often trivialized the Confederation 
Congress in comparison to the Constitutional Convention, 
they have usually linked the Ordinance of 17 87 with the 
Constitution in their interpretations. It was John Adams 
who originally connected the two in importance; these "two 
authorities," he said, provided the means by which the 
organization of the republic might be concluded "with 
unexpected dignity."5
However, where Adams found "unexpected dignity," 
historian Staughton Lynd discovered a duplicitous bargain. 
Lynd suggests that the famed anti-slavery article of the 
ordinance was one half of a purely sectional deal. In 
return for northern support of the three-fifths clause of 
the Constitution southern delegates at the Confederation 
Congress agreed to the banning of slavery in the Northwest 
Territories through Article Six of the ordinance.6 Paul 
Finkelman adds to Lynd's argument by noting the 
inconsistencies between Article Six and the rest of the 
ordinance. He implies that with neither funds nor power 
provided for its enforcement, Article VI was merely a 
cosmetic addition to an ordinance that otherwise fully 
protected the property of the slave holder.7
Other historians focus on real, rather than chattel,
7property. Through comparison with Jefferson's Ordinance of 
1784, Merrill Jensen portrayed the later ordinance as a 
victory for land speculators--with the prize being the 
millions of acres sold to the Ohio Company for as little as 
ten cents an acre. According to Jensen, it was the earlier 
ordinance that "provided for democratic self-government of 
western territories, and for that reason it was abolished 
by the land speculators and their supporters."8
Arthur Bestor described the Ordinance of 1787 as a 
repudiation of the liberal Jeffersonian principles of its 
predecessor. He considered similarities between the 
Ordinance of 1784 and its successor of 1787 to be mostly 
superficial.9 Not all historians agreed. For Robert F. 
Berkhofer, Jr. the "1787 document [was] more an extension 
and replacement than a repudiation of the Ordinance of 
1784."10
These interpretations may be partially resolved by 
looking, not at the two ordinances, but at the governments 
that framed them. The relative freedom granted by the 
Ordinance of 1784 was necessary because the government to 
which the potential new state would belong--the 
Confederation--was considered by its framers to be 
appropriately weak. In December 1783, just before he 
submitted the report describing the Ordinance of 1784, 
Jefferson wrote that "the constant session of Congress can 
not be necessary in time of peace."11 Under these 
circumstances it is not surprising that the chairman of the
8committee on western lands felt it necessary to give the 
new states of the West as much free rein as possible. 
Western states were to be perpetual members of the 
Confederation, not the union as we now know it.
The weakness of the Confederation was corrected by the 
Constitution when many of the powers formerly left to the 
states were given to the central government. Regardless of 
whether members of Congress knew of the specific debates 
taking place in Philadelphia, they were aware of the mood 
of the Constitutional Convention.12 The strength of the 
proposed national government made possible an enlarged role 
for the central government in territorial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .1  ^
The Ordinance of 1787 took advantage of this while 
retaining the promise of republican equality once statehood 
was achieved.
Historians have debated everything from the authorship 
of the ordinance to its constitutionality.14 In doing so 
they have followed a well-trodden path. No aspect of 
western policy was agreed upon by the leaders of the early 
republic. Passage of legislation did not simplify the 
matter; almost every provision for the realization of 
western policy was likewise challenged. While sectional 
interests played an important role in setting the 
parameters of debate, the character of dissent was often 
defined by ideological criteria.
Nowhere is this more evident than in Virginia. Most
9Virginians recognized the inevitability of western 
settlement. An expansive settlement pattern was one of the 
better-known traits of their state. But acknowledgment of 
the situation did not lead to consensus on an appropriate 
response. The most pressing question to Jefferson, Monroe, 
and Washington was not whether the West should be settled 
but rather how to govern the West and integrate it into the 
Union once such settlement had taken place.
10
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CHAPTER II 
VIRGINIA AND THE WEST, 1780-1787:
THE VIEWS OF JEFFERSON, MONROE, AND WASHINGTON
More than most travelers, Thomas Jefferson kept up with 
his correspondence. As newly appointed American minister 
to Paris, he relied on letters to keep posted on the latest 
developments in Congress as well as in Virginia. On June 
23, 1786, he might very well have reflected on how little 
was new on the other side of the Atlantic. His latest 
communication from James Monroe contained little good news. 
Congressional business was at a standstill with few members 
in attendance. Money troubles continued, and yet another 
series of Indian treaties had been signed, though it was 
unclear if these would be any more successful than their 
predecessors. The debate over western lands had also been 
resurrected, a new form of government having evidently been 
proposed. But what was Monroe saying? "It [the new form 
of government] is in effect to be a colonial government 
similar to that which prevailed in these States previous to 
the revolution."1
Monroe did not provide Jefferson with a great deal of 
detail about the proposed changes. The size of the new 
western states was to be increased, thereby decreasing 
their total number to only three or five. In addition,
12
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Congress was to appoint all senior territorial officials. 
The most important difference between the American and 
British territorial systems, according to Monroe, was that 
American territories would eventually be "admitted into the 
confederacy." While no vote had yet been taken on the 
proposed changes, Monroe believed that the new plan was 
"generally approved" by his fellow c o n g r e s s m e n .^
Jefferson's response was polite yet insistent. He 
feared that many congressmen supported Monroe's plan for 
the wrong reasons. To formulate a policy based on the 
needs and potential benefits of the "maritime states" was 
an exercise in bad faith. Instead, Jefferson argued that 
Congress should "state the question in it's just form, How 
may the territories of the Union be disposed of so as to 
produce the greatest degree of happiness to the 
inhabitants?"3
There was little agreement as to the role of the 
western territories. Gouverneur Morris argued that the 
undeveloped West should be kept in a state of dependence, 
similar to that which the thirteen states had recently 
escaped. Others opposed western settlement for fear that 
the eastern states would never be able to effectively 
control the strong-willed frontiersmen.4 Some, such as 
Jefferson, acknowledged that the backcountry might be 
uncontrollable but felt that the West not the East, should 
direct its own destiny, even to the point of political
14
independence.5 Though Jefferson and Monroe disagreed on 
some aspects of western policy, they and other Virginians 
always assumed that the West should be part of the Union or 
at least a closely allied sister republic. Their 
disagreement was over how best to secure the West to the 
Confederation. Tied to this were their diverse appraisals 
of the West and its people.
Congressional disagreement over the relationship 
between East and West, or between old states and new, was 
the principal reason for the differences between the 
Ordinance of 1784 and its successor of 1787. The debate 
was not, however, very well informed. Most members of 
Congress had not ventured beyond the Alleghenies. Their 
image of the West was based on faulty maps, travelers' 
accounts, and their own wishful thinking. For some members 
the real West existed only in the speculative certificates 
of land companies. For others it was a region defined by 
negatives--a lawless wasteland, lacking in books, towns, 
roads, and other amenities of civilization.
Although Jefferson had never visited the region, his 
interest in it was well known. By the time of his second 
election to the Continental Congress in 1783, he was a 
recognized authority on western issues.6 It was not 
surprising that he took part in drafting both Virginia's 
cession of her western lands and the Ordinance of 1784 for 
the governance of the same. The latter, in particular, is 
generally regarded as his handiwork. While the full extent
15
of his contribution is debatable, as chairman of the 
committee on western lands he doubtless concurred in the 
general features of the ordinance.
The cession and the ordinance share traits that are 
traceable to the influence of Virginia. A number of 
Virginians were on the congressional committee of western 
lands, where they protected the interests of their state. 
They did so by assuring that Congress closely adhered to 
the restrictions included in the Virginian cession: first, 
that the West should be divided into small states conducive 
to a republican form of government; second, that these 
states should be admitted into the union as equals; third, 
that the western lands should be used for the benefit of 
all Americans, rather than being monopolized by 
speculators.7 This last stipulation was particularly in 
Virginia's interest, as most land companies were based in 
other states, notably Maryland and Pennsylvania.8
Under the Ordinance of 1784 the West was to be divided 
into small states of approximately 15,000 square miles, 
their boundaries based on lines of latitude and longitude. 
Settlers would be responsible for their own government in 
the earliest stage, the only restriction being that it must 
be based on the constitution of one or another of the 
original thirteen states. When a state achieved a 
population of 20,000, it would receive permission from 
Congress to form a permanent government. The state would 
be eligible to join the Confederation when its population
16
equaled that of the "least numerous of the original 
thirteen."^
The ordinance concluded with an enumeration of the 
principles upon which "both the temporary and permanent 
governments [were to be] established." The new states were 
required to be perpetual members of the Confederation and 
their "respective governments" were to be "republican."
They were also subject to the Articles of the Confederation 
in the same manner as the original thirteen, including 
responsibility for a full share of the federal debt. They
were restricted in their powers to tax federal property,
and the property of nonresidents was to be taxed at the 
same rate as residents. "The preceding articles . . .
formed . . .  a charter of compact" and were to "stand as 
fundamental constitutions . . . unalterable . . . but by
the joint consent" of Congress and the respective states.10
As soon as the Ordinance of 1784 was passed, work began 
on a supplementary ordinance to facilitate the sale of
western lands. As early as 1776 Jefferson had attempted to
amend the proposed Articles of Confederation to allow 
Congress full control over Indian lands purchased in the 
territories--a process that would have initiated the 
creation of a national domain. Lands purchased by Congress 
were then to "be freely given to those who may be permitted 
to seat them."11 This proposal was. never seriously 
considered, and Jefferson was overruled by the pressing 
needs of the Confederation treasury. Money troubles
17
continued to plague the new nation into the 17 80s. Western 
lands were seen as a painless panacea that could cure the 
ills of congressional finance, and most members of Congress 
favored land sales as the most expedient means of reducing 
the debt. Putting a price on the national domain also 
protected the investments of land speculators, including 
several members of Congress. An additional benefit would 
be the discouragement of marginal settlers. Those able to 
afford the purchase price should also be able to afford the 
price of improvements, and there would be less danger of 
settlers becoming impoverished.
Jefferson's initial draft of the land ordinance called 
for a decimal system of land division similar to his more 
successful plan for monetary reform. Congress kept the 
overall scheme of the rectilinear survey but rejected 
Jefferson's attempt to redefine the familiar, albeit 
unwieldy, acre, mile, and chain into decimal units.12 In 
this more modest form Jefferson's proposal was adopted as 
the Land Ordinance of 1785, which initiated a program for 
the division and sale of western lands. Two goals of the 
ordinance were to provide a structure for the sale of 
public lands and to prevent boundary disputes and title 
conflicts through a standardized system of rectangular 
surveys.
The Ordinance of 17 84 was never implemented. This was 
not due to any deficiencies of the ordinance but rather to 
the relative lack of settlement northwest of the Ohio. The
18
blame for that shortcoming must rest with Congress and its 
failure to adequately support the Land Ordinance of 1785. 
Though enacted later, the Land Ordinance was meant by its 
framers to be a prerequisite to the earlier ordinance. 
Without the regulated settlement made possible by the 
survey system of the Land Ordinance, the orderly society 
envisioned by the Ordinance of 17 84 would not be possible. 
As Congress quibbled over the details of western policy and 
searched hopelessly for adequate funding to implement those 
policies agreed upon, men more familiar with the West 
warned that time was running out. In a letter to Richard 
Henry Lee, George Washington noted that it was impossible 
to "stop the road" of western migration, though it was in 
the power of Congress to "mark the way." But, Washington 
warned, if Congress hesitated too long, it would soon "not 
be able to do either."15
During the 17 80s Kentucky was the principal area of 
settlement in the trans-Appalachian West. Jefferson was 
well aware of the rapid growth occurring in these 
westernmost counties of Virginia. A surge of migration 
increased the population from a few hundred to more than 
75,000 in just over ten years.14 Viewing Kentucky as the 
norm, Jefferson saw the duty of Congress to be fairly 
straightforward— the formal establishment of new states 
followed quickly by their incorporation into the Union as 
equal members.15 The thousands of people already settling 
in the West would initiate their own local governments and
19
institutions. If Congress would set forth the conditions 
of statehood, westerners themselves would take care of 
meeting those conditions.
The simple legislation of the Ordinance of 17 84 was not 
adequate, however, to solve the nation's problems in the 
Northwest territories. Whereas Kentucky was quickly 
maturing, the Northwest appeared destined to remain a 
chaotic frontier for much longer. Squatters were swarming 
to the north shore of the Ohio, upsetting already delicate 
Indian relations. Most of the tribes in this region had 
sided with' the British during the Revolution, and it was 
feared that they would do so again, especially with British 
troops still in possession of the northwestern posts 
despite American diplomatic protests.
It is doubtful that the Confederation government was in 
a position to occupy these forts even if the British had 
complied with the peace treaty. The prevailing fear of a 
standing army coupled with the distrust of a strong central 
government and a general war weariness combined to limit 
military actions.16 When the British did voluntarily 
withdraw from their post on Penobscot Bay in Maine, 
Washington had no choice but to ask the Massachusetts 
militia to occupy it. The forces of the United States were 
unable to do so because the "few troops remaining in 
service" and the "great distance of Penobscot . . . totally
prevent[ed] [his] sending a Detachment to receive 
possession of that Garrison from the British."17 Some
20
members of Congress were doubtful whether the United States 
should occupy the northwestern posts because of the 
"inconveniences arising from the great distance [to] the 
posts, their exposed situation and the expense attending 
them."18 Even the French inhabitants of the Illinois 
country, who admitted the sovereignty of the United States, 
had to beg Congress to provide them with a proper 
government.19
It was also becoming clear that Spain intended to block 
another American right promised by the Treaty of 1783--free 
navigation of the Mississippi. This closure would not only 
damage western trade but also polarize opinion within the 
Confederation as the carrying states of the northeast 
squared off against the agricultural South and West in a 
debate colored entirely by sectional interests. By the 
most simple definitions of sovereignty, the United States 
was not in full control of its national domain.
Immediately after the passage of the Ordinance of 1784 
Jefferson went to Paris, where he replaced the aging 
Franklin as American minister to France. As principal 
author of the ordinance and the Virginia cession Jefferson 
had been instrumental in securing the acceptance of these 
two acts, each of which met the conditions deemed necessary 
by Virginia in the surrender of her western claims. Even 
though both acts were ultimately accepted by Congress, 
passage was not easy. Virginia had "insisted on hard
21
terms,” and it was only the pressing financial needs of the 
Confederation that led to the cession's acceptance.^0
With Jefferson's departure, the task of protecting 
Virginia's interests in the West was assumed by Monroe. 
During his first congressional term Monroe had served under 
Jefferson on the committee for western lands, and in 1784 
he succeeded Jefferson to the chairmanship. The younger 
man quickly moved to become personally familiar with the 
western territories. In late July 1784 he journeyed 
through western New York to the lower Great Lakes. From 
there he meant to tour the northwest posts, visit the upper 
Ohio country, and return thence to Virginia, but his 
itinerary was shortened by Indian hostilities and the 
active discouragement of the British, who were still firmly 
in command of the northwest posts.21 The following summer 
Monroe planned to accompany the congressional peace 
commission to the Indian treaty conference at the Falls of 
the Ohio. Once again he was forced to cut short his trip 
as a result of the hostility of some tribes and poor 
travelling conditions.22 Though abbreviated, these two 
trips served as a catalyst to Monroe's revaluation of his 
thinking on western policy.
As late as 1783 Monroe's view of the West was quite 
similar to Jefferson's. In October of that year he 
"assured" George Rogers Clark that the Virginia legislature 
wished "to effect a separation [of the Kentucky 
settlements] and erect an independent State westward, as it
22
will enable [Virginia] to economize [her] affairs . . . and
give [her] greater strength in the federal councils." 22 He 
was much less optimistic after visiting the region. Just 
before his second departure in August 17 85, he had 
"confess[ed]" to Jefferson that he doubted the wisdom of 
Kentuckian independence, not because that region was unfit 
for statehood, but because of the disadvantage such a loss 
would bring Virginia. Not only would a smaller Virginia 
lose influence, but her congressional power would be 
reduced by the increase in the number of states. Monroe 
also implied that the potentially numerous states of the 
Mississippi Valley would ignore the needs of the older 
states of the Atlantic seaboard.24
Monroe returned from this second trip West with 
increased conviction of the need to alter the plan for 
governance of the western territories. To Madison he 
acknowledged his fear that the admission of new states 
would result in a confederacy "so fluctuating [that] there 
will never be energy or calculation on it either at home or 
abroad, every thing will be in a state of incertainty."25 
With Jefferson he was slightly less alarmist, writing 
instead "of the impolicy of our measures" regarding the 
West.26
Monroe was instrumental in altering the Ordinance of 
1784 to reflect the conditions he had witnessed. These 
changes provided the "colonial government" he described to 
Jefferson in his letter of May 1786. In that letter,
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however, Monroe did assure Jefferson that the new plan 
would preserve the "most important principles of the act," 
namely,, that once the territories reached a minimum 
population they would be "admitted into the confederacy" as 
equal members.27 This latter point was, without doubt, the 
most important aspect of America's territorial policy. 
However, through emphasizing the prospective statehood of a 
territory, it is easy to lose sight of Monroe's 
prerequisite "colonial government." Jefferson, who 
certainly did not, feared that western settlers would be 
unwilling to remain in a confederation that did not provide 
for fundamental rights, specifically the right of self- 
government .
While Jefferson understood Monroe's rationale for 
increasing the size and thus decreasing the number of 
states, he did not trust the motives of Monroe's 
congressional supporters. The younger Virginian simply 
wished to shorten the time necessary to achieve statehood: 
by reducing the number of states, any one state would 
easily include the territory and the population of three or 
four of Jefferson's smaller states and thus be eligible for 
full statehood much sooner.28 Jefferson, however, realized 
that the question was more than one of size. Convinced 
that small republics were preferable, he also believed that 
western settlers themselves preferred smaller states. Most 
of all, he recognized the partisan logic that drove some 
members of Congress to support larger states. By arguing
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for fewer western states, Monroe was inadvertently lending 
support to the argument that the West should have less 
power and a smaller voice in the national government.
Monroe was soon to realize the same.
Two months later, on July 16, 1786, Monroe advised 
Jefferson that some members of Congress wished to go far 
beyond merely reducing the number of states: it was 
"plainly the policy of these men to . . . keep them [the
western states] out of the confederacy altogether." Such a 
"mischievous . . . policy" could only be "calculated to
throw [the West] into the hands of Great Britain."29 
Through population quotas and other restrictions, 
representatives from New England were attempting to 
"rescind everything" they had agreed to in the Ordinance of 
1784. Nor were they willing to leave it at that, as Monroe 
also warned Jefferson of "an intrigue . . .  to occlude the 
Mississippi," closing it to American trade.30
On December 16, 1786, after a three-month leave from 
writing due to a dislocated wrist, Jefferson wrote to 
Madison expressing his alarm over Congress' reversal over 
the proposed division of western states--making them "fewer 
and larger." Jefferson viewed this, together with New 
England's attempt to close the Mississippi, as a purely 
partisan action designed to secure advantage for the 
northeastern states. Together, these measures made the 
break-up of the Confederation much more likely. As 
Jefferson explained, "it might have been made the interests
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of the Western states to remain united with us, by managing 
their interests honestly and for their own good. But the 
moment we sacrifice their interests to our own, they will 
see it better to govern themselves. The moment they 
resolve to do this, the point is settled. A forced 
connection is neither in our interests nor within our 
power."31
This concern points to the basic difference between 
Monroe and Jefferson over governance of the territories. 
Jefferson preferred to see settlers as Americans first. He 
feared that if they were not accorded those rights and 
liberties enjoyed in the thirteen eastern states, they 
would break away to form their own nation. His fears 
appear more plausible when it is remembered that he 
expected most settlers to be drawn from the native-born of 
the eastern states. He was opposed to immigration from 
monarchist countries, because he feared that it would "warp 
and bias" the direction of American society "and render it 
a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass."^2 Foreign 
migrants were likely to prove even more troublesome in the 
West. Native-born Americans, on the other hand, would not 
only be well versed in their republican responsibilities 
but would also expect to enjoy the same republican rights 
as their countrymen in the East. A West settled by eastern 
Americans would require less instruction and less outside 
control because its settlers were already Americans.
Monroe and others who had actually visited the West
26
tended to disagree, as did the majority of Congress in 
1786. While members of the Continental Line had expressed 
an interest in settling veterans together in a new western 
state as early as 1783, most settlers were believed to be a 
different caliber of people.33 Washington pointedly 
described them as a "parcel of Bandetti" who "bid defiance 
to all authority." Worse, they were "skimming and 
disposing of the Cream of the Country at the expense [of 
those who had] fought and bled to obtain it."34
Washington's concerns were threefold. As commander in 
chief he was well aware that western lands were about the 
only compensation the officers and men of the Continental 
Army could expect from the beleaguered Congress. He also 
feared an Indian war, doubtless provoked by these irregular 
western settlements; Washington did not trust western 
settlers to respect the boundary of Indian lands. To 
secure the separation between red and white he proposed "a 
Proclamation . . . making it a Felony . . . for any person
to Survey or Settle beyond the Line" of lands legally 
purchased from the Indians. He further proposed that the 
military "should have pointed and peremptory orders" to 
enforce the proclamation.35
In effect, Washington was advocating a return to the 
British policy of separation attempted with the 
Proclamation of 176 3, but his rationale was not limited to 
preventing conflict with the Indians. For "even supposing 
no disputes . . . with the Indians [or] that it was not
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necessary to guard against . . . other evils," a compact
settlement would still be preferable to allowing "People to 
roam over a Country of at least 500,000 Square Miles 
contributing nothing to the support, but much perhaps to 
the Embarrassment of the Federal Government."36
Washington's views were also colored by his personal 
hopes for the West. Many of the "bandetti" he encountered 
were squatters on his own land. And he, like most men of 
property, took a dim view of trespass. Additionally, a 
compact settlement would help to maintain property values. 
Jefferson, by contrast, was much more trusting. He doubted 
in 1784 that settlers were squatting on the north side of 
the Ohio. But if they were, he was sure that "[tjhese very 
people will be glad to pay the price which Congress will 
ask to secure themselves in their titles to these lands."37
Washington knew better. Even with the power of the 
courts behind him, he found it difficult to evict 
squatters. With his extensive western land holdings, he 
had a large personal stake in the West. By his own 
calculations he owned about 40,000 acres just along the 
Ohio River.38 As a property owner, he was unwilling to 
leave western development to chance. To strengthen 
economic connections, he advocated a system of inland 
navigation to link the Ohio with the James and Potomac 
rivers. Not only would this increase the value of his 
lands, but the increase in trade would serve to cement the 
interests of the West with those of the maritime states,
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particularly Virginia.3  ^ To maintain political connections 
he advocated a strong central government to control the 
unruly western "bandetti."40
The views of men such as Washington and Monroe helped 
persuade Congress to take a different view of the West. At 
the same time, inhabitants of Illinois were asking Congress 
for a stronger government and reminding delegates that not 
all western settlers were transplanted Americans. On June 
22, 1784, these Illinoisans petitioned Congress that they 
might be permitted to "form a new state." In addition, 
they noted that it would be "necessary for Congress to send 
. . . somebody to help . . .  in drawing up a constitution."
This assistance was needed because the inhabitants had 
"always been governed by the military" and had "never had 
experience with the machinery of a republic."41 Unknown to 
Congress, the petitioners, a minority of those living in 
Illinois, had misrepresented their region. While the 
Illinois region was officially under a military governor, 
the self-reliant French had usually managed their own 
affairs, in much the same manner as colonial New 
Englanders.42 But Congress did not know this. As late as 
1787, Madison confessed that the problem of government for 
the settlements of Illinois was "a subject very perplexing 
in itself; [one] rendered more so by our ignorance of many 
circumstances on which right judgment depends."43 To be 
sure the Americans were probably inclined to doubt the 
ability of the French to govern themselves. The humble
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request of the Illinoisans contrasts sharply with petitions 
from the upstart "state" of Franklin in western North 
Carolina (now Tennessee). There the "privileges of 
American citizens" were assumed and the Declaration of 
Independence was held up as an example to justify their 
actions.44
The Franklinites and other separatists wrongly believed 
that the Ordinance of 17 84 gave them the right to form 
their own governments and then apply to Congress for 
admission into the Confederation.46 This was not the 
intent of Congress, and the ambiguities that made this 
misinterpretation possible were removed from the new plan 
of government, the Ordinance of 1787, which also corrected 
other perceived deficiencies of the Ordinance of 1784.
Members of Congress had soon began to doubt the wisdom 
of Jefferson’s policy of minimal interference in the West, 
especially in regard to the northwest territory.46 Rather 
than sturdy republican farmers, the national domain seemed 
to only attract squatters and other undesirables. The 
Ordinance of 1784 was clearly inadequate. Distant 
territories, where the authority of the United States was 
tenuous at best, were not the best place to experiment with 
Jefferson's idealistic notions of government. Most 
congressmen were more inclined to accept Washington's view: 
Territorial government should reflect the needs of the 
federal government, and, when possible, settlers should be 
selected to fit the needs of the government, rather than
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molding government to meet the needs of backwoods 
"bandetti." Richard Henry Lee described the Ordinance of 
1787 as "much more tonic than our democratic forms on the 
Atlantic."47 This was necessary, he wrote to Washington, 
"for the security of property among uninformed, and perhaps 
licentious people as the greater part of those who go there 
are."48 Even those New Englanders who had once opposed 
westward migration now advocated the same as a means of 
improving the territory.4^
In Virginia the spectrum of thought toward the West may 
be neatly symbolized by the opinions of Jefferson, Monroe, 
and Washington. All three men agreed that "new states . .
. must be the inevitable consequence of emigration to [the 
West]."50 They disagreed on the best means of securing 
these states to the union. For Jefferson, the republican 
sentiments of westerners would be enough to connect them to 
the American republic, although he did see the need to 
promote an economic connection as well; thus his 
encouragement of Washington's involvement in improvements 
of Potomac navigation. But Washington was much more 
insistent on the importance of this connection. In 
addition to the bond of trade, he also felt that the right 
sort of people had to settle in the West. Unwilling to 
trust westerners to do what was best for the United States, 
he thought they should to be persuaded to do so, preferably 
through legislation, but by force if necessary. Monroe,
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through the evolution of his own thought, served as an 
ideal compromise between Jefferson's idealism and the more 
conservative views of such men as Washington. Monroe 
realized that it was not enough to legislate equality as 
the Ordinance of 17 84 had done. Personal experience 
convinced him, like Washington, of the dangers in 
Jefferson's hands-off policy, especially during the 
beginning stages of territoriality. The changes he 
proposed to Jefferson's Ordinance of 1784 were designed to 
give the new states the resources they needed to become 
truly equal members of the nation.
Monroe's proposed revisions in territorial government 
eventually became the core of the Ordinance of 1787. 
Admittedly, his "colonial government" was initially less 
democratic than the Ordinance of 1784. But self-government 
was only deferred, not denied. Jefferson's proposal that 
western states should be "free and independent" was widely 
accepted by 17 87.51 Additionally, his amendment banning 
slavery--rejected by Congress in 1784--was adopted in 1787 
by an almost unanimous vote. Jefferson's idea of a compact 
between the old states and the new was also revised and 
expanded into the six Articles of Compact of the Ordinance 
of 1787.
Washington's concerns with Indian relations were 
addressed by both the ordinances of 1785 and 1787. Through 
its requirement of prior survey the Land Ordinance 
effectively separated white settlement from Indian lands.
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This same requirement also encouraged compact settlement— a 
necessity of good government in Washington's view. The 
Ordinance of 17 87 reminded settlers that only Congress 
could lawfully wage war against the Indians.
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CHAPTER III 
EXPLICATION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 17 87
It has often been charged that the Ordinance of 1787 
was the quintessential product of a bureaucratic committee. 
Matters are further complicated by the frequently changing 
membership of the committee responsible for the ordinance. 
From 1784 until 1787 a total of thirteen men served on this 
five-member committee.1 These "different" committees would 
often rearrange the work of their predecessors to suit 
their own views of western policy. The various working 
drafts of the ordinance at times appear almost unrelated. 
The text of the final document is a reflection of these 
changing priorities. However, the underlying principles 
were essentially those intended by Jefferson and Monroe.
Lack of direction is most evident than in the 
organizational scheme of the ordinance, one of its more 
unusual attributes. The document may be divided into three 
sections, but the first section appears to be an 
afterthought. Rather than outlining the territorial 
government, it provides a detailed description of the 
inheritance law for those who die intestate. This section 
also includes the brief acknowledgment of the property 
rights of the French inhabitants of the Illinois region.
Not until the middle section is the structure of the
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territorial government described, along with the duties, 
responsibilities, and terms of office of the governor and 
other principal officials. The six Articles of Compact, 
composing the final section, are an agreement between 
Congress and the future state governments of the region to 
protect the civil rights of the inhabitants.
Section One: Permanent Laws of Inheritance and Property
It is from the standpoint of stability that this oddly 
placed section on inheritance gains importance; in effect 
it encouraged widespread land ownership, an important 
republican principle. By it was recognized the right of 
all children--of both sexes and including those of previous 
marriages--to an equal portion of an estate.
It was not enough for Congress to simply demand that 
new states have republican governments, although Article V 
of the ordinance did include this prescription. In 
addition, a republican society had to be encouraged. As 
Jefferson and others realized, a wide distribution of 
wealth would promote a similar distribution of power. The 
"equal partition of inheritances" was vitally important if 
a government were to be "truly republican."2 While 
Congress did not advocate a general redistribution of 
wealth, it was quite willing to alter the distribution of 
wealth under those circumstances that typically fell within 
the sphere of government.
When someone died intestate it was customary for the
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local government to decide the future of his estate. In 
the seventeenth century most of the American colonies 
followed the English custom of primogeniture. However, by 
the eighteenth century this practice was subjected to 
increasing criticism. By the time of the Revolution many 
colonies had, through custom and statute, replaced 
primogeniture with a more equitable distribution scheme. 
Still, in most cases the eldest son could expect to receive 
a greater share than his siblings, and children from 
previous marriages were often neglected.3
The intestate inheritance section of the ordinance 
continued the reforms initiated by individual states and 
carried them through to their logical conclusion. In an 
early draft of the ordinance (1786) this section had 
included an explicit example that emphasized the right of 
daughters as well as sons to an equal share of intestate 
property.4 Though the example was removed from the final 
draft, the intent to protect the inheritance of all 
children remained.
This 1786 draft is also interesting in its arrangement 
of the sections. Appropriately, the description of 
officials and their powers is first, followed by the 
Articles of Compact (without Article VI on slavery) and the 
section on intestate inheritance.5 When the two drafts are 
compared, it is apparent that their meaning is the same.
The 1787 version is more concise, but it still retains the 
full intent of the 1786 version. The difference is in
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placement. The decision to begin the Ordinance of 17 87 
with the section on inheritance was deliberate; it was not 
due to the committee's disorganization, nor was it a last 
minute addition. This encouragement of widespread property 
ownership was intentionally republican and also eminently 
practical, as good republican legislation should be. The 
widow retained her traditional third, but no advantage was 
given to first-born sons or younger brothers.
Methods of conveyance and tenure were simplified as 
well. This greatly facilitated property ownership and 
transfer, an advantage for the family farmer as well as for 
the land speculator.6 Nathan Dane, the committee member 
responsible for this section, thought it "vastly 
important." And while this section could be repealed upon 
achievement of statehood, it was Dane's intention that the 
custom of equitable inheritance "take root in the first 
settlement" and thus become "permanent."7
This section also included a clause guaranteeing to 
"the french and Canadian inhabitants & other settlers of 
the Kaskaskies, Saint Vincents and the neighboring villages 
who have heretofore professed themselves citizens of 
Virginia, their laws and customs now in force among them 
relative to the descent and conveyance of property."8 This 
assurance was not included in either the Ordinance of 17 84 
or any of the intervening drafts, though it does partially 
replicate one of the conditions of the Virginia Act of 
Cession.
41
This guarantee is reflective of the supremacy of the 
national government. Under the Ordinance of 1784 it was 
not necessary to explicitly protect the rights of the 
inhabitants because it was assumed that they would do so 
themselves. Jefferson, as a member of both Virginia's 
congressional delegation responsible for the cession and 
the committee that drafted the Ordinance of 1784, would 
certainly have included this clause if he had9 thought it 
necessary. There is also a significant difference in the 
wording of the Ordinance of 1787 and that of the Virginia 
cession. Where the ordinance only protected certain 
property rights, the act of cession stipulated that these 
settlers were to "have their possessions and titles 
confirmed to them and be protected in the enjoyment of 
their rights and liberties."9 Here the settlers were 
explicitly protected in rights and liberties beyond those 
relating to property. Such a guarantee in the Ordinance of 
1787 would have created conditions under which state laws, 
and to a limited extent state sovereignty, would have been 
superior to those of the nation. Under the Ordinance of 
1784, which allowed a high degree of local sovereignty, 
such a guarantee was not necessary. Under the Ordinance of 
1787 it would have been in conflict with the overall 
intention of the ordinance.
Section Two: A Temporary Territorial Government
Rather than leaving settlers to their own devices, the
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Ordinance of 1787 gave Congress a measure of firm control 
through the almost unlimited power of the territorial 
governor. His power was especially strong during the 
initial stages of territoriality. As commander in chief of 
the militia, the governor could appoint all officers below 
the rank of general officer, as well as any magistrates or 
civil officers he thought necessary. Together with three 
congressionally appointed territorial judges, he was 
responsible for promulgating the legal code of one of the 
thirteen original states for use in the territory. While 
this code could be repealed once statehood was achieved, 
it was expected that the future state government would 
retain the legal system under which it was founded. 
Stability and continuity were also assured by a system of 
staggered terms for territorial officials.10
After the territory contained at least 5,000 adult 
"free male inhabitants," the governor was to authorize the 
election of a House of Representatives. This body would 
then nominate ten persons to Congress, of whom five would 
be chosen to serve on the Legislative Council. The Council 
and the House, together with the governor, formed the 
General Assembly, which elected the territory's single 
representative to Congress and was responsible for adopting 
laws for the territory, as well as initiating all money 
bills. As a member of the Assembly the governor could 
introduce legislation, and as senior executive officer he 
had absolute veto over its acts. He also had the power to
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"convene, prorogue, and dissolve" the Assembly whenever he 
thought such actions "expedient." These were the powers 
described by Monroe as "in effect a colonial government."11 
The prerogatives assigned to the territorial governor were 
very similar to those of a British imperial governor.
Although the governor's control over the Assembly was 
extensive, it was not unchallenged. The territorial 
delegate elected to Congress, while not allowed to vote, 
was permitted to take part in congressional debate. 
Presumably, he would also become familiar with Congress, 
its personnel, protocol, conventions, and connections. As 
an elected official, the territorial representative was in 
a position of more potential power than the territorial 
governor, who was subject to congressional recall at any 
time.
After serving as an "apprentice" representative, the 
territorial delegate would be an obvious candidate for 
election to Congress once statehood was achieved. Once 
again, stability and continuity are the key emphasis. The 
lesser status of territoriality was made much easier to 
accept by the built-in provision for its end. As soon as a 
district had a population of 60,000 it was to be admitted 
to the union as a full and equal partner with the original 
thirteen states. This clear means of ending territoriality 
did much to assuage bitterness over the loss of republican 
rights experienced by a citizen moving to the territory 
from one of the older states.
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At the same time the territorial status altered the 
future state's relationship with the federal government. 
Unlike the Ordinance of 1784, which allowed settlers a 
greater voice in their own government, thus encouraging a 
loyalty to the state potentially greater than loyalty to 
the nation, the Ordinance of 1787 first made territorial 
citizens subject to the federal government through its 
appointed officers. in this manner, the superiority of the 
federal government was clearly established.
Section Three: A Permanent Bill of Rights
The Six Articles of Compact were intended by Congress 
to form the foundation of "all laws, constitutions, and 
governments1 of the territory and to provide for the 
"establishment of States" as full and equal members of the 
Union.12 Congress also had the option to offer statehood 
to a territory before this threshold population was 
reached.
Article I. Religious worship was not to be "molested" 
so long as such worship was conducted in a "peaceable and 
orderly manner." Notably, this article did not provide for 
complete freedom of religion but only freedom of worship, 
qualified in the interests of order. This was not the 
first time religious liberties had been protected in the 
old Northwest. The religious, civil, and property rights 
of the French inhabitants had been guaranteed by the state 
of Virginia in 1780 when it organized the region into a
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county.13
Article II. The legal rights of the inhabitants were 
fully protected. Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, moderate 
fines, and the right to bail were guaranteed. "Cruel and 
unusual punishments" were prohibited. Proportional 
representation insured that the legislature would be 
responsive to the electorate. The remainder of this 
article was devoted to the preservation of property rights; 
citizens whose personal property was taken for public use 
were to be completely compensated. It was further 
suggested "that no law ought ever to be made, . . . that
shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with, or affect 
private contracts, . . . previously formed."
This clause may be the result of congressional concern 
over Shays's Rebellion. Committee member Nathan Dane must 
have been painfully aware of this uprising in his home 
state. And as an eastern lawyer he doubtless had little 
sympathy for the debt-ridden western farmers. The disdain 
in which they held the legal profession combined with their 
readiness to interfere with the due process of law through 
the force of arms must have especially damned them in 
Dane's eyes.14
Debt relief was a consistent theme of the Shaysites.
In Massachusetts there had earlier been a movement for a 
government moratorium on the payment of debts. Merchants 
who would be adversely affected by a debt moratorium 
considered such an action to be outside the proper sphere
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of government. As William Pynchon and others instructed 
Springfield's representative to the General Court, "no 
government can possibly have a right to alter private 
contracts, already made."15 Living in an economy that 
relied heavily on credit, they felt the creditors should be 
protected. By including this clause to protect private 
contracts, Congress warned insolvent farmers away from the 
volatile frontier.
However, it was only a warning, not an injunction. The 
phrase "ought not" implies that the framers did acknowledge 
that there were indeed times when such drastic measures 
might be necessary. Before the constitutional prohibition 
on state interference with contract responsibilities, most 
of the thirteen states had initiated some form of 
legislative debt relief. Such actions usually took one of 
three forms: installment laws allowed payments to be 
divided and then made over a period of time; stay laws 
postponed payment beyond the original contract period; and 
commodity laws allowed payment in a specified commodity 
rather than in specie.15 Any of these measures would 
impair a merchant's ability to do business, for he also 
bought on credit. When faced with the loss of much of his 
expected revenue he would be inclined to agree with 
Manasseh Cutler's hyperbolic assessment of Shays1s 
Rebellion: the "commonwealth" of Massachusetts was, he 
feared, "on the very border of anarchy."17 Cutler later 
assisted the government by recruiting for General Lincoln's
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army, which marched against the insurgents.18
Cutler's alleged participation in drafting the 
Ordinance of 17 87 is one of the minor debates surrounding 
it. Cutler, General Rufus Putnam (who also fought against 
Shays) and General Samuel Parsons were the directors of the 
Ohio Company. This speculative enterprise was formed by 
several Massachusetts Continental officers for the purpose 
of settling veterans and others on the Ohio frontier.1^
In the spring of 1787, while the ordinance was under 
consideration, the Ohio Company petitioned Congress to 
purchase several million acres beyond the seven ranges that 
had already been surveyed.20 Cutler personally visited 
Congress on July 6 to argue the company's position. While 
there, he was given a draft copy of the ordinance upon 
which he indicated several changes he would like to see.
He later noted in his diary that all except one were 
incorporated into the ordinance. Unfortunately, this is 
the only concrete evidence for Cutler's role in the 
ordinance. Cutler's contribution may be justifiably 
narrowed to those portions of the ordinance not borrowed 
from earlier drafts. This elimination, coupled with his 
role in Shays's Rebellion, points toward the contract 
clause. The qualifying phrase "ought not" used to 
introduce this section may be explained by Congress' 
reluctance to fully adopt Cutler's suggestion. It is also 
possible that Cutler had some input into the third Article. 
However, both Articles Two and Three may also be
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attributable to Dane, likewise from the Bay State and 
equally familiar with both Shays's Rebellion and the 
importance New Englanders placed on virtuous behavior.21
Article ill. "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being 
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, 
schools and the means of education shall forever be 
encouraged." This article, together with the Land 
Ordinance of 1785, gave public education a solid foundation 
in the territory. The "rights, property, and liberty" of 
the Indians are also protected, except in the case of "just 
and lawful wars authorized by Congress." While expressing 
a republican ideal, this last passage is probably primarily 
indicative of Congress' concern for the prevention of 
costly and inopportune wars.
It is because of the Land Ordinance that both sections 
of this article were functional. Not only did that 
ordinance reserve Section 16 of each township for the 
support of education, but it also decreased Indian/white 
conflict through separation. By requiring that lands be 
surveyed prior to settlement, the Land Ordinance put a 
brake on unchecked immigration, thereby lessening the 
pressure on Indian lands.
Article IV. The territory and those states formed from 
it were to be permanent members of the Union, with all the 
rights and responsibilities such membership entailed. As 
equal'members of the Union, new states would be required to 
honor their share of the national debt. Taxation of
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federal property was forbidden, and absentee landowners 
were protected from being taxed at a higher rate than 
resident land owners. All navigable streams and portages 
between them were reserved for public use in perpetuity.
Article V. The number of new states was limited to 
between three and five, with boundaries corresponding 
roughly to modern state boundaries. At both the state and 
territorial levels governments were required to be 
republican and were also bound to uphold the principles of 
the Articles of Compact. Statehood was guaranteed once the 
territory achieved of population of 60,000, though Congress 
could elect to allow an earlier admission if it were deemed 
in the interests of the Confederation to do so. Large 
territories would meet the minimum requirements much sooner 
than the smaller territories stipulated by the Ordinance of 
1784.
Article VI. Slavery and involuntary servitude were 
prohibited except as a punishment of crimes. Fugitives-- 
presumably this applied primarily to escaped slaves--could 
be "lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to" their place of 
legal servitude.
Historians have thoroughly debated this article. Its 
origins, purpose, and effectiveness have all been called 
into question. Nathan Dane, the man responsible for its 
last-minute addition, was amazed at its easy acceptance.
He was not, however, the originator of the idea.^2
Jefferson was the first to propose that slavery be
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eventually banned in the West. And if Dane's Article VI is 
compared with Jefferson's earlier clause from the Ordinance 
of 1784, the two are remarkably similar. It is, in fact, 
easier to enumerate their differences. Jefferson's clause 
restricted slavery throughout the national domain after the 
year 1800. Dane's appeared to take effect immediately but 
was limited to the Northwest Territory. Only the 1787 
document provided for the return of fugitives. Beyond 
this, Dane's Article VI was taken almost word for word from 
the earlier ordinance.
The legal expertise of Dane may be called into question 
by the haphazard manner with which the slavery clause was 
attached to the Ordinance of 1787. Conflicting language in 
the remainder of the ordinance was not removed. No 
provision was made for the enforcement of the anti-slavery 
clause, nor was any indication given who would be 
responsible for its enforcement.23
Still, there remains the seemingly inexplicable 
southern support for this clause. Slavery was important in 
the South of 17 87 though it was not unique to that region, 
nor was it yet the crucial litmus test of sectional 
identity that it would become in later years. Sectional 
issues of the Revolutionary era were usually framed in 
terms of commercial and producing states. The West, as a 
potential agricultural region, was thus considered a 
natural ally of the plantation South. With the West 
already inclined to support the South because of this
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common bond, Southerners were willing to restrict slavery 
as a means of lessening competition in staple agricultural 
products such as tobacco and hemp.24 Slaveowners were 
protected by the "fugitive" clause. While the Northwest 
was to be a free territory, Congress did not intend it to 
become a haven for runaway slaves.
The Ordinance of 1787 was intended to provide "for the 
government of the Territory of the United States northwest 
of the River Ohio." For that limited purpose it must be 
judged a success. The development of the old northwest 
surpassed all expectations of the time. The ordinance was 
also successful beyond the bounds of the territory for 
which it was initially prescribed. With modifications, the 
principles of the ordinance were used in the governance of 
all United States territories until the Civil War. 
Ultimately, the most important provision of the ordinance 
was its well-defined program for the eventual inclusion of 
territories within the union as full and equal members.
Jefferson's philosophy of letting the needs of the West 
determine western policy was never seriously considered by 
the national government, though it did help modify the more 
conservative opinions of such men as Washington. The views 
of Monroe were far more typical. While his perspective 
changed with time, Monroe's ideal western program was 
always determined by the needs of the East, particularly 
his home state of Virginia. Fortunately for the West, men
such as Jefferson, Monroe, and Washington, were in favor 
new states in the West.
The western problem faced by the early republic was 
twofold. How was the west to be secured? And how was 
Congress to assure that a west thus secured would be a 
positive addition, rather than a hindrance, to the Union 
A policy that combined firm control with the republican 
principles of self-government was the ideal answer. The 
ordinance achieved this balance in its coupling of 
temporary and permanent measures. Together with the 
Constitution, the Ordinance of 1787 made possible the 
continental expansion of the United States.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER III
1Of these thirteen men, four, Thomas Jefferson, James 
Monroe, Edward Carrington, and Richard H. Lee, were 
representatives of Virginia.
zThomas Jefferson, "Foundation . . . for a Government 
Truly Republican," in Adrienne Koch, ed., The American 
Enlightenment: The Shaping of the American Experiment and a 
Free Society (New York, 1965), 300.
^Marshall Dee Harris, Origin of the Land Tenure System 
in the United States (Ames, Iowa, 1953), 61, 198, 319-320.
4The Committee consisting of Mr. Johnson, Mr.
Pinckney, Mr. Smith, Mr. Dane, and Mr. Henry . . . submit
the following report to the consideration of Congress. . .
(New York, 17 86) .
5Ibid.
6Jay A. Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787 
(New York, 1891), 55-56.
7Nathan Dane to Daniel Webster, March 26, 1830, in 
Charles M. Wiltse, ed., The Papers of Daniel Webster, 15 
vols. to date (Hanover, N.H, 1974- ), III, Correspondence, 
1830-1834, 43-48. In this same letter Dane claimed that he 
was the "framer of the celebrated ordinance." As the "only 
member of Congress living who had any concern in forming" 
the ordinance, his claim was unchallenged. But his role 
should be understood in the same manner as the carpenter 
who frames a house while following the blueprint of others.
Dane deflated the importance of Jefferson’s "meagre, 
inadequate plan of '84." Monroe fared no better. Not only 
is he not mentioned, but Dane dismissed his plan of 
government as "not important." Most significant, Dane 
failed to acknowledge the guiding principles of both 
Virginians that were incorporated into the Ordinance of 
1787.
Ultimately, Dane's claim rests on the fact that he 
literally wrote the final draft. In his letter to Webster 
he stated that he "never claimed originality, except in 
regard to the clause against impairing contracts, & perhaps 
the Indian article, [and] part of the 3d article."
^Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., Territorial Papers of the 
United States, (Washington, D.C., 1934- ), II, 40-41.
9The Virginia Cession of Territory Northwest of the 
Ohio [March 1, 1784]," in Boyd, ed., Jefferson Papers, VI, 
578-579.
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10Terms of office were two years for representatives, 
three years for the governor, four years for the 
territorial secretary, and five years for the Council. 
Judges were appointed for life. All appointed officials 
were subject to congressional recall.
11James Monroe to Jefferson, May 11, 1786, in Boyd, 
ed., Jefferson Papers, IX, 511.
12All quotations within descriptions are taken from 
the appropriate article of the ordinance.
13William Waller Hening, ed., The Statutes at Large: 
Being a Collection of all of the Laws of Virginia 
(Richmond, Va., 1821), IX, 553.
14A s a member of Congress, Dane believed it improper 
for him to speak out too strongly on what was, strictly 
speaking, a state affair. "He alluded," however, "to the 
late commotions" in Massachusetts and expressed a desire 
"to see the government again restored to its former 
firmness and order." (Nathan Dane, "Address Before the 
Massachusetts House of Representatives" [Nov. 9, 1786], in 
Burnett, ed., Letters of the Members of the Continental 
Congress, VIII, 504-505. See also, Dane to Thomas Dwight, 
March 12, 1787, ibid., VIII, 556.)
15William Pynchon, Thomas Stebbins, Reuben Bliss, and 
Thomas Williston to Samuel Lyman [Springfield 
representative to the General Court], as quoted in David 
Szatmary, "Shays' Rebellion in Springfield," in Michael F. 
Konig and Martin Kaufman, eds., Springfield, 1636-1986 
(Springfield, Mass., 1987), 53.
16Steven R. Boyd, "The Contract Clause and the 
Evolution of American Federalism," William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3d Ser., XLIV (1987), 534.
17Manasseh Cutler to Winthrop Sargent, Oct. 6, 1786, 
as quoted in David Szatmary, Shays' Rebellion: The Making 
of an Agrarian Insurrection (Amherst, Mass., 1982), 72.
18Ibid., 89.
1^Ibid., 86; Barrett, Evolution of the Ordinance of 
1787, 46.
20Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the 
United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New 
York, 1950), 355-56.
21Dane claimed authorship of these two articles. 
However, in light of their late addition to the ordinance 
it is possible that Dane added them at Cutler's insistence.
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It is also possible that Cutler pressed for the 
reintroduction of the ban on slavery found in Article VI. 
See note 7 above.
22Dane to Webster, March 26, 1830, in wiltse, ed., 
Webster Papers, III, 43-48. While Dane acknowledged 
Jefferson's attempt to exclude slavery after 1800, he 
failed to note that it would have applied to all the West, 
including the cessions of south of the Ohio, where Dane 
himself voted to admit slavery.
22If these basic problems were solved there still 
remained the problem of funding the clause's enforcement. 
See Paul Finkelman "Slavery and Bondage in the 'Empire of 
Liberty,'" in Frederick D. Williams, ed., The Northwest 
Ordinance: Essays on its Formulation, Provisions, and 
Legacy (East Lansing, Mich., 1988), 72-77.
24William Grayson to Monroe, Aug. 8, 1787, in Burnett, 
ed., Letters of the Members of the Contintental Congress, 
VIII, 631. See also Drew McCoy, "James Madison and Visions 
of American Nationality in the Confederation Period: A 
Regional Perspective," in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, 
and Edward C. Carter, II, eds., Beyond Confederation: 
Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity 
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1987), 236-237, and Peter S. Onuf, 
Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance, 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1977), 111-113. As noted in the 
Introduction, it has been argued that this article was part 
of a sectional trade-off. See Staughton Lynd, "The 
Compromise of 17 87," in Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, and 
the United States Constitution (Indianapolis, Ind., 1967), 
185-213. In return for northern support of the three- 
fifths clause of the Constitution, southern delegates at 
the Confederation Congress agreed to the banning of slavery 
in the Northwest Territory. Lynd finds support for this 
possibility in a reference in Manasseh Cutler's diary to a 
certain Mr. Hamilton. Assuming this was Alexander 
Hamilton, Lynd suggests that these two men engineered a 
sectional compromise that also served the needs of the Ohio 
Company. The inexplicable nature of southern support for a 
ban on slavery also lends weight to Lynd's hypothesis. 
However, to suggest that southern sectionalism has always 
been grounded in advancing the sphere of slave labor is to 
allow the powerful arguments of the nineteenth century to 
intrude into a time when their validity is more easily 
challenged. Sectionalism was present, and slavery was 
often a part of sectional differences. But as Drew McCoy 
has ably argued, it was not the critical factor in 
sectional identification. (McCoy, "Madison and Visions of 
American Nationality," 236-237.)
Lynd does acknowledge other reasons for southern 
support such as the fear of competition from the 
agricultural produce of the Northwest and the implicit
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guarantee of slavery's protection in the Southwest. Drew 
McCoy considers these latter points more important than the 
possible compromise. He contends that the crucial 
difference was between the "carrying states" of New England 
and agrarian remainder of the nation. Within this scheme 
the agricultural West would naturally ally itself with the 
agricultural South. Both arguments highlight the 
importance of eastern sectional politics in determining 
western policy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Adams, John. "A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of 
the United States of America--(1787-1788)." In The American 
Enlightenment: The Shaping of the American Experiment and a 
Free Society. Edited by Adrienne Koch. New York: G. 
Braziller, 19 65.
Alvord, Clarence Walworth, ed. Collections of the Illinois 
State Historical Library. 37 vols. Springfield, 111.: 
Illinois State Historical Society, 1903-1978.
Burnett, Edmund C ., ed. Letters of Members of the Continental 
Congress. 8 vols. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, 1921-1936.
Carter, Clarence Edwin, ed. Territorial Papers of the United 
States. 28 vols. Washington, D.C.,: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1934- .
The Committee consisting of Mr. Johnson, Mr. Pinckney, Mr. 
Smith, Mr. Dane, and Mr. Henry . . . submit the following
report to the consideration of Congress.  ^ ! ! New York: 
1786 .
The Committee consisting of Mr. Mercer, Mr. Lee, Mr. Gerry, 
Mr. Howell, and Mr. Paine, "Appointed to Consider of the 
Measures Proper to be Adopted in Order to Take Possession 
of the Frontier Posts" . . . Beg Leave to Observe. . . . 
Annapolis, M d .: 1784.
Jefferson, Thomas. "Foundation . . . for a Government Truly 
Republican." In The American Enlightenment: The Shaping of 
the American Experiment and a Free Society. Edited by 
Adrienne Koch. New York: G. Braziller, 1965.
______ . Notes on the State of Virginia. Edited by William
Peden. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1954.
______ . The Papers of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by Julian P.
Boyd. 23 vols to date. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1950- .
Madison, James. "The Federalist, No. 38." In The Federalist:
A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States. 
Edited by Edward Gaylord Bourne. New York: Tudor Publishing 
1947.
Monroe, James. The Writings of James Monroe: Including a 
Collection of His Public and Private Papers and 
Correspondence Now For the First Time Printed. Edited by
57
58
Stanislaus Murray Hamilton. 7 vols. New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1898-1903.
Morse, Jedidiah. The American Geographer; or A View of the 
Present Situation of the United States of America. . . T ~ 
Elizabethtown, N.J., 1789.
Paine, Thomas. Public Good— Being an Examination of the Claim 
of Virginia to the Vacant Western Territory. Philadelphia, 
Pa., 1780.
Rush, Benjamin [Nestor, pseud.]. "To the People of the United 
States." Carlisle Gazette, July 5, 1786.
Thorpe, Francis Newton, ed. The Federal and State
Constitutions. 7 vols. Washington, D.C.,: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1947.
Washington, George. The Writings of George Washington. Edited 
by John C. Fitzpatrick. 39 vols. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 19 31-44.
Webster, Daniel. The Papers of Daniel Webster. Edited by 
Charles M. Wiltse. 15 vols. to date. Hanover, N.H.: 
University Press of New England, 1974- .
Secondary Sources
Barrett, Jay A. Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787. New 
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1891.
Beeman, Richard, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter, II, 
eds. Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and 
American National Identity. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1987.
Berkhofer, Robert F. "Jefferson, the Ordinance of 1784, and 
the Origins of the American Territorial System." William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., XXIX (1972): 231-262.
Billington, Ray. "The Historians of the Northwest Ordinance." 
Illinois State Historical Society Journal, XL (1947): 397- 
413.
Bloom, John Porter, ed. The American Territorial System. 
Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1973.
Boyd, Steven R. "The Contract Clause and the Evolution of 
American Federalism." William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 
XLIV (1987): 534.
Briggs, Winstanley. "Le Pays Illinois.1' William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3d Ser., XLVII (1990): 30-56.
59
Burnett, Edmund Cody. The Contintental Congress. New York: 
Macmillan, 1941.
Calhoon, Robert M. The Loyalist Perception and Other Essays. 
Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.
Coles, Edward. History of the Ordinance of 1787.
Philadelphia, Pa.: Historical Society of Pennsylvania,
1856 .
Cunningham, Noble E., Jr. In Pursuit of Reason: The Life of 
Thomas Jefferson. Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1987.
Eblen, Jack E. "The Origins of the United States Colonial 
System: The Ordinance of 1787." Wisconsin Magazine of 
History LI (1968): 294-314.
_____________ . The First and Second United States Empires:
Governors and Territorial Government, 1784-1912.
Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968.
Finkelman, Paul. "Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance: A 
Study in Ambiguity." Journal of the Early Republic, VI
(1986): 343-370.
Harris, Marshall Dee. Origin of the Land Tenure System in the 
United States. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1953.
Hening, William Waller, ed., The Statutes at Large: Being a 
Collection of all of the Laws of Virginia. 13 vols. 
Richmond, Va., New York, and Philadelphia, Pa.: 1819-1823.
Hilliard, Sam B. "A Robust New Nation." In North America: The 
Historical Geography of a Changing Continent. Edited by 
Robert D. Mitchell and Paul A. Groves. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1987.
Horsman, Reginald. The Diplomacy of the New Republic, 1776- 
1815. Arlington Heights, 111.: H. Davidson, 1985.
Jensen, Merrill. The New Nation: A History of the United 
States During the Confederation, 1781-1789. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950.
Lynd, Staughton. Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United 
States Constitution. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1967.
McCoy, Drew R. The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in 
Jeffersonian America. Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1980.
Onuf, Peter S* "Toward Federalism: Virginia, Congress, and
60
the Western Lands." William and Mary Quarterly,. 3rd Ser., 
XXIV (1977) : 353-374.
 . The Origins of the Federal Republic:
Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States, 1775- 
1787. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1983 .
______________ . Statehood and Union: A History of the
Northwest Ordinance. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University 
Press, 1987.
Peterson, Merrill D. "Jefferson, the West, and the
Enlightenment Vision." Wisconsin Magazine of History, LXX
(1987): 270-281.
Skaggs, David Curtis, ed. The Old Northwest in the American 
Revolution: An Anthology. Madison, Wis.: State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin, 1977.
Skelton, William B. "The Confederation's Regulars: A Social 
Profile of Enlisted Service in America's First Standing 
Army." William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., XLVI (1989):
771.
Slaughter, Thomas P. The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue 
to the Revolution. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Szatmary, David. Shays' Rebellion: The Making of an Agrarian 
Insurrection. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1982.
_______________ . "Shays' Rebellion in Springfield." In
Springfield, 1636-1986. Edited by Michael F. Konig and 
Martin Kaufman. Springfield, Mass.: Springfield Library and 
Museums Association, 1987.
Taylor, Robert M., Jr. The Northwest Ordinance, 1787: A 
Bicentennial Handbook. Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana 
Historical Society, 1987.
Williams, Frederick D., ed. The Northwest Ordinance: Essays 
on Its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy. East Lansing, 
Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 1988.
VITA
Leslie Scott Philyaw
Born on December 3, 1955 in Setzer's Gap, North Carolina, he 
received his B.A. in history from Western Carolina 
University in 1983. He entered the M .A . program in history 
at the College of William and Mary in 19 87 and is currently 
in the Ph.D program in history at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
